Harry Frankfurt’s Compatibilist Theory
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt represents the ideas of opportunity of will and opportunity of activity, yet more essentially, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism hypothesis. Compatibilism enables the opportunity of will to exist in the deterministic world. Frankfurtean compatibilism gives a more refined model than Humean compatibilism. Humean compatibilism has precluded the deterministic idea from claiming freedom the capacity to have picked something else. Frankfurt includes a further refinement inside our wants, and infers that our will is free if and just on the off chance that we follow up on a first-arrange want dictated by our second-arrange want.

It seems to me both natural and useful to construe the question of whether a person’s will is free in close analogy to the question of whether an agent enjoys freedom of action. Now freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants. (Frankfurt, p. 15).

Suppose that a person enjoys both freedom of action and freedom of the will. Then he is not only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to want what he wants to want. It seems to me that he has, in that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or to conceive. (Frankfurt, p. 17)
A man had freedom of activity (concerning act A) when she completed A, and her will was to complete A, yet in the event that she had willed to accomplish something different, she would have accomplished something unique. A man had opportunity of the will (as for willing W) when her will was W, and her second-request will was to have will W, however in the event that she had second-arrange willed to will something different, she would have willed something unique. A man is free (concerning act A and will W) when she completed A as the consequence of will W, and she had both opportunity of activity and freedom of the will (as for A and W, individually).
Brainwashing is comparable to powers outside our ability to control. Frankfurt’s hypothesis still holds, since we don’t concern the starting point of Sam’s second request want. When he has an unrestrained choice, it suggests that his demonstrations uninhibitedly by offering out his organization. Truth be told, Frankfurt appears to debilitate the hypothesis of determinism. In the event that some outside powers causally decide Sam’s the second request want, at that point Sam can’t have wanted something else. In other words, he can’t have two forms of second request want, neither of which enables him to have opportunity of will or freedom of activity. That is, Frankfurt’s hypothesis prompts a very surprising conclusion when Frankfurtean compatibilism does not concur with determinism.