A discussion on the nature King Philip II of Spain’s Mediterranean strategy in the 16th century.
This paper examines how much of Philip II?s Mediterranean policy focused on a ?necessary? war, waged with an unknown chance of victory and how questions still remain as to whether or not Philip possessed a Grand Strategy and the influence it had on events in the Mediterranean. It references Braudel from a thematic perspective and uses Geoffrey Parker’s notion of ‘Grand strategy’ as a basis for the argument. It also discusses and analyse the threat of the Turk, the threat of France and England and explores the actual aims and objectives of the Spanish strategy in the Mediterranean in context to 16th century Spanish society.
The scale of Spain’s Empire in the 16th century can prove somewhat misleading when studying Philip’s attitude towards the Mediterranean. With lands from Sicily to Cuzco forming the greatest empire ever known since the creation of the world, it is perhaps difficult to distinguish between Philip’s imperial strategy and his Mediterranean policy. Philip’s imperial strategy was generally defensive. The Armada was sent to protect the Netherlands from the English threat and to put an end to attacks on colonial Spain and her privateering and France and Germany were both occupied in defence of the Netherlands. Whilst affairs in the Mediterranean may well resemble a similar theme, the main difference was the nature of nature of the opposition.