Foreign Affairs

April 5
Williams on Clinton
1. Engagement and enlargement of the international institutions-maintain American dominance but in a self-restrained way
2. Globalization-interdependence, joint objectives in solving global issues, economical welfare rather than military security, China
Walt-unprecedented dominance, unipolar international system, very little constrains, US the half-hearted hegemony, reluctant to use power; US becomes the status quo power, 21% public don??™t know international problems and satisfied;
Engagement-NATO to keep US pacify Europe and Asia, US would keep this role and not isolationism; press allies in getting involved (troops and money) because of public pressure: why bother
NATO becomes a white elephant
1. Expansion-Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999
2. Bosnia-collective security outside of NATO for the 1st time ???out of area operations???
3. East Asia-US-Japan relations-1995 multi-security treaty; JAPAN doesn??™t have to expand militarily (nuclear), relief for Japanese
4. Engage China in global economy-played softly on human rights issues, WTO, continue to guarantee Taiwan??™s independence, bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese sees as lack of UN authorization and expansion of American sphere of influence through interfering the internal affairs of a sovereign state; but did not stop China from entering WTO
5. Russia-relation deteriorated-NATO expansion into formal Warsaw Pact states; compared to Cold War, still good relation; Russia relied heavily on US economically
6. WMD-nonproliferation-convinced Eastern European states (Ukraine) to give up nuclear weapons (promises of economic aid, pressure from international institutions) in establishing nonproliferation regimes, use diplomacy; PTVT, CTVT-cannot test nuclear weapons anyway Clinton did not approve and did not stop Indian-Pakistani testing; NPT 1968-Article 6 only allowed several countries to have nuclear weapons and no others can, highly discriminative
7. Economic recovery and expansion
8. Diplomatic achievements: Uruguay rounds, NAFTA
9. Efforts to promote human rights-Bosnia, Kosovo; but uneven performance-withdrew from Somalia, Rwanda (very weary because of the local conditions and little interest) and goes against rule of sovereignty
10. US as a benie superpower
Mastanduno-US also restrained in 1990s
1. Balance of power theory by Kenneth Waltz-disequilibrium after the Cold War (unipolar systems, others fear and balance US) US to recognize this is inevitable, lead to mutipolar international system; Steven Walt-balance of threat theory-states balance not against material capabilities but threats (distance, perceptions of power); US still perceived by others as benie hegemonic power, maintained military advantage but also use diplomacy to communicate and engage in self-restrain, so others bandwagon rather than balance. Security domain: Walt??™s prediction applicable; economic domain: Waltz??™s prediction more applicable.
2. Mastanduno-increasing economic disputes with Japan; growing concern over China??™s growing surplus; agriculture
1. Long distance
2. Benign hegemon
3. US maintained preponderance
4. Statecraft/diplomacy
5. Bandwagoning rather than balancing
6. In economic domain, balance of power domain prevails: Japan; growing concern about China; EU-agricultural agreements and subsidies
7. Mixed strategy: economic hardball but security softball: multilateralism
8. Pg 169: economic danger doesn??™t spill to the military domain; maintain domestic support for global engagement, avoid excessive commitment; avoid acting unilaterally, arrogance of power
Article: Obama tariff on Chinese tires, mixed balancing, absence of military balancing
Ikenberry: different, from liberal perspective
1. Waltz-America will be challenged and balanced-wrong
2. America is a liberal hegemon: not more power but qualitatively different than previous hegemons
3. Basis: 1. Alliances and markets-Germany and Japan 2. Geographic history: states worry about more about isolation rather than intervention 3. Democracy and international institutions: reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized, seek to instruct international order; penetrative hegemony: listen to criticisms
4. These characteristic restrained American power
Cox: failure of all scholars, dominated by realism views, only looked at balance of power but ignored change of society and economy; Globalization, norms, culture, ethics, scientific methodology; 313 as a result, scholars got 1990s wrong just as 1980s; key trend 60s, 70s:
1. Vietnam War
2. USSR starts to catch up, achieves parity
3. New economic challenges: Japan, Germany
3 things to change decline: Paul Kennedy
1. Soviet collapse
2. Clinton economics, elimination of budget deficit
3. Europe and Japan economic suffers
4. America thus becomes more dominant, no foreseeable challenges
April 12
General public, experts shocked about 911
Direct parallel with the end of the cold war: same prediction failure
Qualitative difference: peaceful ending and collapse of Soviets doesn??™t fit well to the established theory of international relations, very hard to explain. But 911 fits well indeed: power generates counter-reactions; still most commentators surprised??”this is surprising
Cox: story doesn??™t end here; opens opportunity for US 271
1. Provides US with purpose and rationale that it lacked before; helps America to mobilize power; increasing military influence; led to expansion of American influence
2. Boost of military credibility, massive increase of military spending 36 billion in 2002, 48 billion in 2003; illustrated the extent to which the US no longer seemed to require the active military support of its allies
3. Domestic impact even more important-Patriot Act: why no one opposed Sense of fear; rise of patriotism; department of homeland security created budget: 38 billion; finally kicks the Vietnam syndrome
1. Taliban is universally unpopular and weak
2. Nature of attack justified; boost to legitimacy of US response; even Soviets and Chinese accepted US military involvement; circumstances were exceptional and unlikely to be replicated again
Lessons that bush learned: power matters and US can and should act alone in
US becomes drunk with power; Brooks ??“ use power wisely; Cox ??“ US will blow it
Russian and Chinese doesn??™t sell weapons to the Taliban: different from when Soviets were in Afghanistan
Johnson: before 911, foreseen attack on homeland is eminent
1. February 1998 Italy; US public thought just an accident; but there are more to it: the fundamental question it raised: why are the US military there at the first place There are no threats: American troops there for stability; locals will be very pleased ??“ increase security
2. Unspoken word: EMPIRE; most Americans not aware: because it is in secret and the use of comforting rubrics-indicating US is the victim but not the perpetration
But US is generating resentment-attack on US homeland ???BLOWBACK???
April 14
First example: Lockerbie bombing-retaliation for bombing for Libya 1986
Second example: bombing of American embassy in Kenya??¦Osama; for future terrorist attacks; he was supported by U.S. before??¦page 11 1991-1st Gulf War U.S. stationed large number of troops in Osama??™s homeland Saudi Arabia
Assessment of the trajectory of American power: American empire is actually extremely fragile, not based on legitimacy, very little acceptance around the world; simply based on military superiority; only to generate more blowback; more military power, more blowback
Kennedy-1987 the rise and fall of the great powers-US continue to decline and suffer hegemony decline
US military action in February 2002-achieve regime change in Afghanistan (Soviets couldn??™t). Shift of opinion from his book; he admits he was wrong, American seems to be on the up: in global military terms, there is only one country that counts; American response to terrorism showed more asymmetry than the terrorists: US and all of the other major powers. Global military superiority: 13 aircraft carriers. Also economic resurgence in the 90s: 50% of world GDP, late 1980 18%, in 2000 up to 30%: US able to sustain military expenditure: military spending in GDP 6 to 3 percent from 80s to 90s.
Second article ???maintaining??? during 911 2001. US have material and resources to respond effectively, but poses economic and diplomatic issues. Compared with imperial Britain.
Challenge for American to maintain
1. Military-with small powers (tech to small powers poses future threats); unwillingness to accept high casualties; asymmetric threats
2. Economic-
3. Diplomatic
April 19
Kagan-division between America and its western allies; crisis in Atlantic relations; all-time high after cold war-Kosovo-first time to military directly
911-at first seemed united-but later diplomatic crisis; NATO was created for collective defense, terrorist attack was on the most important state-how to respond Lord Roberson invoked article 5-unprecedented; US rejected their help; US did not want member states to veto; article 5 was for America to protect Europe, not the other way around; these issues were of concerns after the cold war: Balkans war: Europe could not even organize: Americans made the dinner, Europeans did the dishes; but solidarity after 1945; but conflict after 911-most serious division after WWII; agree on Saddam is a problem, but division on policy instruments; Europe preferred multilateral diplomacy; Americans were concerned with end results-use force; power divide was the cause because Europeans were weak and Americans were strong; one explanation for solidarity: Americans and Europeans shared democratic institutions-democratic peace theory-common external threat; Europe was pivotal in global balance of power; this should persist after 911, but Kagan said no; Europeans remained weak and regional, with the end of cold war, power distribution changed-from bipolar to unipolar distribution of power; therefore secondary powers would start fear US, structural problem
Leffler-post revisionist
4 strategies
Preemptive war, willingness to act unilaterally, maintain military superiority, forceful diplomacy
April 21
Leffler-Bush doctrine
1. American values, did not mention American interest
2. Fears and threats
reasonable, prudence
1051-post war strategy of preponderance
Ikenberry and Kupchan-2004 election-defining turning point
Pure power politics
Page 39 two assumptions
1. Unipolarity is not generating bandwagoning, but hatred
2. Unipolarity is not durable
3. Overestimated military power
April 26
Military contract, military industrial complex
Presidency has been increasingly autonomous since cold war
Humanitarian intervention-bases to expand global empire
Page 4
Ferguson page 14
Parallel with Egyptian empire: develop allies